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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
vs. 
MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 20021038-SC 
REPLY BRIEF 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DANGEROUSLY EXPANSIVE 
READING OF RULE 22(e) DEFIES STATE v. TELFORD AND 
THREATENS THE FINALITY OF ALL CRIMINAL SENTENCES 
In its opening brief, the State questioned whether a sentence could be illegal for 
purposes of rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, but still limit the range of 
sentencing on remand. Br. Petitioner at 1-2. Defendant responds, claiming that the court 
of appeals did not rely on rule 22(e) to determine whether the original sentence was 
illegally imposed. Br. Respondent at 7. Specifically, defendant claims that the reference 
to rule 22(e) in the court of appeals' first decision, State v. Samora (Samora I), 2001 UT 
App 266 (memorandum decision), was insufficiently clear to establish that the sentencing 
issue was reached under rule 22(e). Id, Defendant also claims that it does not matter 
whether the court of appeals relied on rule 22(e), because the result should be the same 
whether the court classified the initial error as rule 22(e) error or not. Id. at 7-8. 
The court of appeals, however, did rely on rule 22(e). It referenced rule 22(e) in 
Samora I. See 2001 UT App 266, n.l. More importantly, in State v. Samora (Samora II). 
2002 UT App 384, 59 P.3d 604, the case now on certiorari review, the court expressly 
characterized the initial sentence as a rule 22(e) "sentence imposed in an illegal manner." 
Id. atfflf 16,23. 
Moreover, as explained in the State's initial brief, whether the initial sentence is or 
is not a rule 22(e) sentence is a pivotal question. If the initial sentence was imposed in an 
illegal manner under rule 22(e), the sentence is void, the presumption of vindictivenss set 
forth in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), does not apply, and the State 
wins. If the initial sentence is not a rule 22(e) sentence, the Pearce presumption does 
apply and the State loses. 
But the issue before this Court is larger than who wins or loses this case. The 
court of appeals' decisions in Samora /and Samora II hold that a sentence has been 
imposed in an illegal manner under rule 22(e) and is correctable at any time if either rule 
22(a) error, the failure to affirmatively invite sentencing input from defense counsel at an 
in-absentia sentencing, or 22(b) error, the failure to make adequate inquiry into the 
voluntariness of a defendant's absence at sentencing, has occurred. See Samora /, 2001 
UT App at 266 & n.l. Even more significantly, the court of appeals' decisions suggest 
that a sentence imposed in a proceeding where any procedural error has occurred qualifies 
as a "sentence imposed in an illegal manner" under rule 22(e) and is therefore correctable 
at any time. The court of appeals' reasoning defies State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, 48 P.3d 
2 
223, where this Court held that rule 22(e) claims must be narrowly circumscribed to avoid 
abuse. Id. at f^ 5. The court of appeals' reasoning effectively repeals normal appellate 
and post-conviction rules for review of sentencing error and potentially opens the 
floodgates to rule 22(e) challenges in the district courts based on procedural missteps, 
even if insignificant and harmless, that should have been raised on direct or 
post-conviction review. 
A. The court of appeals invoked rule 22(e) in both Samora I and Samora II. 
Defendant claims that the court of appeals did not rely on rule 22(e) in Samora I. 
Br. Respondent at 7. As explained in the State's opening brief, the Samora /court 
characterized the sentence as a rule 22(e) sentence in a footnote in its memorandum 
opinion. See Samora /, 2001 UT App at 266 n. 1. The Samora I court apparently believed 
that defendant's initial sentence was "a sentence imposed in an illegal manner" because it 
had been imposed without providing affirmative invitations to Samora's counsel and to 
the prosecutor to "present information relevant to sentencing" and/or because it was 
imposed in absentia "without adequate inquiry into the actual voluntariness of Samora's 
absence." 2001 UT App at 266 & n.l. 
More importantly, in Samora II, the court of appeals twice characterized the initial 
sentence as a "sentence[] imposed in an illegal manner" under rule 22(e). See Samora //, 
2002 UT App 384, f 16 ("Defendant's original sentence was vacated because he was 
sentenced in absentia. The sentence itself was not illegal, but the manner in which it was 
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imposed was contrary to law. . . . the original sentence was imposed in an illegal 
manner."), ^ 23 ("[T]he trial court illegally imposed sentence in the first sentencing."). 
Thus, the Samora //court held that the original sentence was a rule 22(e) sentence, 
specifically, a "sentence imposed in an illegal manner." The court also held that a rule 
22(e) "sentence imposed in an illegal manner" can be corrected on appeal despite a 
defendant's failure to preserve the issue below and despite the well-settled appellate rule 
that makes plain error review unavailable where a defendant has invited the error 
below. See id. atf 13. 
B. If the initial sentence was a rule 22(e) sentence, the Pearce presumption does 
not apply; if the initial sentence was not a rule 22(e) sentence, the Pearce 
presumption does apply. 
This Court has held that "rule 22(e) claims are not restricted by time limits for 
bringing notice of appeal. Nor are they waived by failure to raise them at the first 
opportunity before the district court." Telford, 2002 UT 51 at f 5. "For this reason, rule 
22(e) claims must be narrowly circumscribed to prevent abuse." Id. 
This Court has never held that some rule 22(e) claims, i.e., claims of "illegal 
sentences," should be narrowly circumscribed, while other rule 22(e) claims, i.e., claims 
of "sentence[s] imposed in an illegal manner," should be broadly construed. The Court 
has not so held because all rule 22(e) claims are, under the plain language of the rule, 
correctable at any time. In State v. Babbel 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991), the Court explained 
that "illegal sentences" are correctable at any time because they are void. Id. at 88. 
Likewise, to classify sentences as "imposed in an illegal manner" must mean that they too 
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are void because they too can be corrected at any time. Otherwise, a defendant could 
challenge any error in sentencing at any time, without regard to appellate jurisdictional 
time limits. Cf Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 1981) (observing in another 
procedural context that the creation of uan alternate means of appellate review . . . could 
make a mockery of the time limits for appeal, [and] undermine the finality of criminal 
judgments"). A sentence is illegal and void where it is not authorized. A sentence is 
"imposed in an illegal manner" and void when it is imposed without authorization, as 
where a court without jurisdiction imposes sentence. See Telford, 2002 UT 51 at j^ 5 n. 1. 
If defendant's initial sentence was merely imposed in error, as the State believes 
that it was, it was not an illegal sentence, nor was it imposed in an illegal manner for 
purposes of rule 22(e). The Pearce presumption may therefore apply, and vacation of the 
harsher subsequent sentence would be appropriate. 
But if defendant's initial sentence was a rule 22(e) "sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner," it was imposed without authority and is therefore void. As explained in the 
State's opening brief, it therefore cannot create any legal rights and the Pearce 
presumption does not apply. 
C. The court of appeals9 decisions make not only rule 22(a) or 22(b) error, but 
any procedural error at sentencing, correctable at any time. 
The issue before this Court, however, is much bigger than who wins this case. The 
court of appeals' decisions in Samora I and Samora II hold that failure of a trial court to 
comply with rule 22(a) or 22(b), a misstep at sentencing, is not just an error that is 
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reviewable through normal appellate and post-conviction procedures, but is an illegality 
reviewable at any time. Moreover, both decisions suggest that a sentence is imposed in 
an illegal manner whenever any procedural misstep occurs at sentencing. The court has 
not explained why rule 22(a) or 22(b) error is different from other sentencing error and 
thus has drawn no line between trial court mistakes that render a resulting sentence 
merely erroneous and those that render the sentence an illegality, i.e., a "sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner." 
Thus, the Samora I and Samora II decisions suggest that a sentence is imposed in 
an illegal manner whenever a trial court errs at sentencing. As stated, "sentence[s] 
imposed in an illegal manner" are correctable at any time. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); see 
also Telford, 2002 UT 51, 5 ("rule 22(e) claims are not restricted by time limits for 
bringing notice of appeal"); cf. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995) ("courts 
have the power to correct an illegal sentence at any time, whether before or after an 
appeal, and even if there is no appeal"). Taken to its logical end, this means that 
whenever a trial court errs at sentencing, that error can be corrected at any time. This 
expansive reading of rule 22(e) endangers the finality of all criminal sentences. 
D. The court of appeals9 decisions effectively repeal normal appellate and 
post-conviction procedural rules applicable to the review of sentencing error. 
By converting all sentencing errors into rule 22(e) illegalities, the court of appeals 
has effectively repealed the appellate and post-conviction rules governing review of 
sentencing error. Under the analysis employed by the court of appeals, whenever an error 
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occurs at sentencing, it may be corrected at any time. It can be corrected even though a 
defendant has failed to preserve his claim below or to establish plain error on appeal. See 
State v Wanosik(WanosikI),2W\ UT App 241,«[ 28 n.l, 3i P.3d 615. Because it can be 
corrected at any time, it can be corrected even though defendant invited the error below. 
See Samora II, 2002 UT App 384, f 13. Because it can be corrected at any time, it can 
apparently be corrected on post-conviction review even though a defendant has not met 
the time limitations or overcome the procedural bars that usually govern post-conviction 
review. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2002) (preclusion of relief); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-35a-107 (2002) (statute of limitations for post-conviction relief). 
E. The court of appeals9 decisions open the floodgates to rule 22(e) motions in 
the district court for claims of sentencing error that should have been raised 
on appeal or in post-conviction proceedings. 
As stated, once an ordinary sentencing error is construed to be a rule 22(e) error, it 
is correctable "at any time" Because this is unequivocal language, it has been reserved 
for very limited circumstances. See Telford, 2002 UT 51, ^ 5 (stating that "rule 22(e) 
claims must be narrowly circumscribed"). 
The court of appeals, however, has held or suggested that a sentence is illegally 
imposed whenever any procedural error occurs at sentencing—whether it be not ordenng 
a competency hearing, not providing a defendant with a copy of his pre-sentence 
investigation report (PSI), sentencing a defendant in absentia without making sufficient 
inquiries about his ability to appear, sentencing an absent defendant without asking for 
input from defense counsel, or some other procedural misstep. See Samora II, 2002 UT 
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App 384,1J 16 (improper sentencing in absentia and/or failure to solicit defense counsel's 
input), Wanostkl 2001 UT App 241, f 28 n.l 1 (rule 22(a) error); State v. Bun\ 2002 I T 
App 288 (memorandum decision) (defendant not given personal copy of PSI); State v. 
Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah App. 1991) (failure to appoint alienist to evaluate defendant 
prior to sentencing). 
If a sentence is imposed in an illegal manner whenever procedural error occurs at 
sentencing, then "sentencefs] imposed in an illegal manner" will include sentences that 
have always been addiessed under normal appellate rules. For instance, a claim could be 
made that a sentence was imposed in an illegal manner where the trial court imposed 
consecutive sentences without considering all legal factors. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-401(2) (Supp. 2002) ("In determining whether state offenses are to run 
concurrently or consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of 
the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of 
the defendant."). A claim might be made that a sentence was imposed in an illegal 
manner because restitution was ordered without a requested restitution hearing. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4) (Supp. 2003) ("If a defendant objects to the imposition, 
amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow 
the defendant a full hearing on the issue."). Alleged error of this kind must now be raised 
on appeal and review is subject to appellate procedural requirements. See, e.g., State v. 
Bluff, 2002 UT 16, ffl[ 66-68, 52 P.3d 1210 (determining whether trial court considered 
statutorily enumerated factors when it imposed consecutive sentences); State v. Breeze, 
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2001 UT App 200, ffi[ 6-9, 29 P.3d 19 (holding that defendant is entitled to a foil 
restitution hearing). 
Under defendant's broad reading of the rule, the reading suggested by the Samora 
I and Samora II decisions, these kinds of error render the sentence imposed illegal under 
rule 22(e). See Br. Respondent at 22 (arguing that a sentence is imposed in an illegal 
manner if it "violates a defendant's rights" or "is based on erroneous information") (citing 
State v. Headley, 2002 UT App 58 n.2 (memorandum decision), which suggests the same 
definition). This broad reading will circumvent the time frame for appellate review in 
cases raising these claims and in cases raising any kind of procedural error at sentencing. 
This broad reading of the rule changes not only what happens on direct and 
post-conviction review, but also what happens outside direct and post-conviction review. 
A motion to correct a rule 22(e) error can also be brought at any time in the district 
court. If the appellate courts classify any procedural error as rule 22(e) error, the district 
courts must grant rule 22(e) motions based on those procedural errors, no matter how 
insignificant the error, how long ago it occurred, or how harmless it may have been. A 
broad reading of rule 22(e) thus opens the floodgates to rule 22(e) motions by defendants 
long since sentenced, who have waived or exhausted their claims, even where the 
defendants do not claim unauthorized sentences or unauthorized sentencing proceedings. 
The vacation of a sentence is not a small matter, even where an equivalent new 
sentence will likely be imposed. Where major crimes have been committed, the necessity 
of resentencing will naturally be traumatizing to victims. Resentencings draw on limited 
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judicial resources. Where years have intervened between the original sentencing and the 
new sentencing hearing, witnesses will sometimes have disappeared and prosecutors, 
defense lawyers, and judges will sometimes have retired. Evidence may have 
disappeared. This could be especially problematic in capital cases that require jury 
sentencings. While the courts and parties may have no choice but to address these 
problems in extraordinary cases, where unauthorized acts have occurred, they should not 
have to address them where ordinary error has occurred that should and could have been 
raised in normal appellate and post-conviction proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The State is not opposed to this Court's affirming the district court's vacation of 
the harsher sentence imposed at resentencing, but it is opposed to affirmance on the basis 
of the court of appeals' rationale. The court of appeals has invoked rule 22(e) in a way 
that suggests that a trial court imposes a sentence in an illegal manner whenever it 
commits sentencing error. That reading of rule 22(e) is inconsistent with this Court's 
precedent holding that rule 22(e) claims must be narrowly construed to avoid abuse. It 
effectively repeals the rules of appellate review, including timeliness requirements, 
preservation rules, and invited error rules. It effectively repeals the rules of 
post-conviction procedure, including time limitations, which must usually be met, and 
procedural bars, which must normally be overcome. Further, it opens the floodgates to a 
large number of rule 22(e) motions in the district courts, potentially providing a 
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mechanism for the vacation of sentences for minor procedural missteps, even harmless 
missteps, that may have occurred at sentencings years ago. 
This Court should correct the analysis of the court of appeals, explain the 
meaning of a "sentence imposed in an illegal manner," and reaffirm its precedent 
holding that rule 22(e) must be narrowly circumscribed to avoid abuse.1 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on _^ __ December 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JEANNE B. INOUYE 
Assistant Attorney General 
1
 If this Court determines that the second sentence was presumptively vindictive, it 
should direct the district court to impose restitution, but also to reduce the fine by the amount 
ordered as restitution. Under statutory law, the imposition of restitution is mandatory. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(a) (Supp. 2003) ("the court shall order that defendant make 
restitution to victims of crime . . . for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea disposition"). Defendant has indicated that he would not oppose 
an order requiring restitution if the court reduced his fine commensurately. See Br. 
Appellant, Case No. 20010988-CA, at 9. 
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